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Scholars of International Relations have generally presumed the existence 
of separate and analytically distinct "levels of analysis" (Waltz, 1959, 1979; 
Singer, 1961; Keohane, 1980; Krasner, 1976, 1991). Various theoretical 
approaches in the discipline can be defined in terms of assumptions about the 
influence of factors operating at the domestic and/or international level on state 
behavior. For realists and neo-realists, the state is considered to act more or less 
independently of domestic social forces, and explanation is sought primarily at 
the international systemic level, in terms of the imperatives of a given 
configuration of international power relations.
Other theoretical traditions have, of course, rejected the assumption of the 
causal primacy of international structure, and the corollary assumption of the 
analytical separation of state and society. Recently, attempts have been made 
to develop more comprehensive empirical analyses by including domestic and 




























































































1983; Haggard and Simmons, 1987; Moravscik, 1991, 1993), and to redefine 
the terms of the debate over the level of analysis (Yurdusev, 1993), or "agent 
and structure" (Wendt, 1991; Hollis and Smith, 1991). Nevertheless, for the 
most part "domestic structures" have been granted a status as second-order or 
supplementary explanatory variable, something to be "added on" to systemic 
considerations. This has been particularly evident in theory and research on 
cycles of free trade and mercantilism.
This article seeks to develop a more synthetic account of the relationship 
between class formation, state policy, and the global political economy by 
analyzing the relationship between the dominant or hegemonic power and the 
evolution of international shipping. The political economy of shipping is highly 
complex, involving sometimes arcane and idiosyncratic commercial and legal 
arrangements. Yet, despite its complexity, international maritime relations have 
displayed, in crystallized form, the more basic political, economic, and legal 
principles of a given era. The history of shipping, broadly speaking, is one of 
cyclical movement of openness (freedom of the seas) and closure (mercantilism), 
and these cycles have developed in tandem with more general cycles of free 
trade and protectionism. Most attempts to understand these general cyclical 
trends have focused on either the international political structure (eg. Krasner, 
1976; Gilpin, 1981; Kindleberger, 1987) or the logic of world capitalism (eg. 




























































































paid to the national arena. A few scholars have, on the contrary, sought to 
explain these trends primarily in terms of domestic politics (eg. O’Brien and 
Pigman, 1992). What is missing in these studies, I argue, is an account of the 
mutual interaction of class, state, and international system.
Class, State, and Structure in International Relations
The preference for systemic theory in International Relations undoubtedly 
owes much to influence of positivism on empirical research, especially in the 
United States (Hoffmann, 1977; Smith, 1992; Guzzini, 1992, 1993). The debate 
between advocates of a systemic approach and those who seek more inclusive 
accounts of domestic and international factors thus turns not simply on empirical 
claims, but also on methodological assumptions and, more generally, 
conceptions of the nature of social science itself. The epistemological 
assumptions of positivism have encouraged realist and neo-realists to seek to 
"uncover" invariate laws relating to systemic properties that transcend particular 
historical periods, cultures, and levels of economic development. Appealing to 
the canon of "parsimony," they have incorporated economic models of rational 
choice to buttress their claims for the superiority of systemic explanations 
(Waltz, 1979; Keohane, 1980; Snidal, 1985; Grieco, 1988; Krasner, 1991).
Yet a growing number of critics have questioned the underlying 




























































































Lapid, 1989). An exclusive or primary focus on the international system appeals 
to the desire for methodological rigor and parsimony. But it paints a stylized, 
one-dimensional, and ultimately unconvincing portrait of continuity across time 
and space. It offers no means of identifying dynamic social, technological, and 
economic factors which produce historical change (Ruggie, 1989, 1993). 
Central to much recent criticism of realism and neo-realism is a rejection of the 
traditional distinction between levels of analysis—and the priority given to the 
international system—not only because this type of methodological approach 
ignores variables that are decisive to historical change, but also because it leads 
to an idealized and static account of the state itself (Wendt, 1987, 1991; Palan, 
1992).
One formidable challenge to the traditional consensus over levels of analysis 
emerged from outside the discipline, in world systems and dependency theory. 
Drawing from the fields of sociology and history, scholars have challenged the 
assertion that states can be considered as autonomous entities or that there is a 
purely power-political logic of international relations (eg.Wallerstein, 1980; 
Amin et al, 1982; Chase-Dunn, 1989). The imperatives of global capital 
accumulation shape the basic political contours of the international system, and 
determine the possibilities for social and economic development of the societies 
within it.




























































































emphasis on the evolutionary, dynamic character of the global political 
economy. Yet, world systems theory has neglected the importance of national 
politics, including class conflicts and domestic political and economic struggles 
that often decisively influence national and international outcomes. 
(Schwartzman, 1989; Skocpol, 1977). The emphasis on a more or less self­
regulating global economy has meant that the state remains more or less 
untheorized and derivative, although now the logic is one of adaptation to the 
structure of the world market, rather than that of global power. Indeed, the 
problems with world systems theory have contributed to something of a 
renaissance of the concept of state autonomy (Skocpol, 1977; Evans, 
Rueschmeyer, and Skocpol, 1985; Nordlinger, 1981; Ikenberry et al., 1989; 
Krasner, 1978, 1992).
More recently, a number of scholars have offered theoretical and empirical 
accounts of state-society linkages that identify, in Robert Cox’s words, "the 
continuities between social forces, the changing nature of the state, and global 
relations" (Cox, 1986:206). An emphasis on continuities, rather than discrete 
levels of analysis, might retain the important insights of world systems theorists 
while avoiding the twin pitfalls of economism and functionalism. Ronen Palan 
(1992) has cited the emergence of a "second structuralist" trend in scholarship 
which focuses on the mutual interaction of processes operating at the level of 




























































































"second structuralist" scholarship is the rejection of the Weberian conception of 
the state as a directly given, atomized actor operating within a framework of 
anarchy in favor of an approach which considers the state to be constituted by 
a combination of domestic and international social forces.
Like world system theorists, scholars who have favored this approach have 
identified structural relationships at the level of the world political economy that, 
within certain limits, shape the choices and constraints of any given state 
(Strange, 1988). However, they also emphasize the causal role which societies 
and states together play in the formation and transformation of these structures. 
The state is thus conceptualized not as a "transmission belt" through which 
global forces-either political or economic-generate domestic changes, but rather 
as a "framework of social and political activities" (Palan, 1992:23) influenced 
by, but also capable of acting upon, global structures.
The "second structuralists" thus reject a strategy for research in which the 
state is viewed passively as an object more or less spontaneously adapting to the 
"logic of the world system." They do not attempt to develop international 
explanations for either global phenomena or national developments. Rather, they 
seek (Palan, 1992:27)
to explain the dynamics of international relationships in the context 
of groups and social classes residing in different societies ... 
identifying concrete relationships between various groups and 
individuals who reside in separate societies....They are primarily 




























































































are related to the state and to the world economy.
The concept of conjuncture has been basic to this type of analysis. The 
conjuncture (Palan,1992:28):
is a point in history wherein series of distinct processes interact to 
produce a given outcome... the conjuncture therefore suggests that 
any given historical event must ultimately be explained in its given 
historical context. There is a certain distance between theory and 
reality which can never be bridged.
Attention has focused on the rise of industrial capitalism in mid-19th century 
England and the corresponding development of global free trade (eg. Cox, 
1987); the rise of American hegemony in the mid-20th century within a new 
Fordist or "corporate liberal" order (eg. Ferguson, 1984; van der Fiji, 1984; 
Rupert, 1990) and the crisis of "regulation" or "social structure of accumulation" 
that occurred in the early 1970s (eg. Aglietta, 1978; Lipietz, 1987; van der Pijl, 
1989; Gill, 1990,1993; Overbeek, 1993; Bowles, Gordon, and Weiskopf, 1990). 
Common to all of these studies has been the analysis of global transformation 
in terms of the mutual interaction of concrete political and economic struggles 
among classes and class fractions within the hegemonic power and the 
opportunities and constraints of a given international system. This type of 
analysis thus shares with world systems theory an emphasis on material factors, 
but it pays closer attention to domestic social and economic conflicts, and to the 
political coalitions which—acting through the state-respond actively to shape 




























































































Explaining International Maritime Evolution
International maritime history provides an especially rich and fertile area for 
an analysis of the "mutual causation" of domestic social forces and international 
factors. The specific commercial and political relations of international 
shipping have been shaped during three basic historical conjunctures. In the 
first half of the 17th century, the Netherlands established a free trading order in 
which the Dutch fleet served as the linchpin of its short-lived hegemony. 
England’s challenge to Dutch hegemony in the mid-17th century gave rise to the 
Navigation Acts, which provided the legal basis for mercantilism. The repeal 
of these acts in the mid-19th century signified, alongside the abolition of the 
Corn Laws, the rise of British free-trade imperialism. The breakdown of the 
free trading system culminated in World War I; between World War I and 
World War II, international shipping was reorganized on a mercantilist basis. 
In the post-World War II era, however, the United States took the lead in re­
establishing a modified system of free trade in shipping.
A satisfactory analysis of each of these conjunctures, it will be argued, 
requires an account of the mutual interaction of forces operating at the national 
and international levels. Cycles of free trade and protectionism have given rise 
to various specific commercial practices. These practices have fostered 
cooperation and global economic development, while simultaneously generating 




























































































or "international systemic" logic that operates independently of national 
developments. A comprehensive explanation for events in each conjuncture—as 
well as the basic evolution of international shipping— requires an account which 
relates both the origins and the outcome of class and factional struggles at the 
national level to the opportunities and constraints inherent in a given 
international environment.
I. THE NAVIGATION ACTS: BRITAIN’S CHALLENGE TO DUTCH 
HEGEMONY
Following its successful struggle for national liberation from Spain, the 
Netherlands enjoyed a short-lived international ascendancy until it was humbled 
by a series of wars with England in the mid-17th century. The half-century of 
Dutch supremacy witnessed the establishment of a new and qualitatively 
different type of international system, based not only on military prowess, but 
also on industrial strength and commercial superiority, especially in banking, 
shipping, and shipbuilding (Boxer, 1965; Wallerstein, 1980; Modelski, 1978; 
Bousquet, 1978; Israel, 1989). The Anglo-Dutch wars were fought in order to 
settle questions of merchant shipping, and their outcome led to a fundamental 




























































































Dutch power was based on command of the seas. The States-General 
established the Dutch East Indies Company and granted it a monopoly of Far 
Eastern trade. A smaller Dutch West Indies Company was also formed to trade 
in the Caribbean. These trading companies, together with the massive Dutch 
fishing fleet, constituted the backbone of Dutch world power. In 1610 the Dutch 
merchant fleet totaled almost one million tons, a figure equivalent to almost one- 
quarter of the tonnage of the present-day Dutch merchant fleet and exceeding 
the size of the contemporary merchant fleets of all but a handful of less 
developed countries. (Gold, 1981:42; Kennedy, 1976: 51) The Dutch fleet 
dominated world seaborne trade. Heavily engaged in cross trades (third party 
carriage), by the mid-17th century it was threatening to monopolize international 
freight markets.
The idea of the "freedom of the seas" was strongly supported by the Dutch 
trading companies and large fishing fleet because they operated under conditions 
of limited military power (Smit, 1968; Boxer, 1965; Potter, 1924; Dumbauld, 
1969). Against the fragmentation of markets and exclusive colonial spheres of 
influence that had been carved out by Spain and Portugal, the Dutch trading 
companies wanted to create a unified world market characterized by free access 
to ships and cargoes. The champion of the new international maritime order 
was Hugo Grotius, a lawyer for the Dutch East Indies Company. Grotius 




























































































of freedom of the seas. He attacked the exclusionary practices of all states, and 
ridiculed the notion that the high seas can be divided territorially by focusing 
on Portugal’s alleged "occupation" of the waters of the East Indies.
Dutch imperialism, however, was on a collision course with the commercial 
revolution that was taking place in mid-17th century Britain. In some respects, 
particularly in shipping and shipbuilding technology, the Dutch economy was 
clearly superior to that of the British. However, the doctrine of Mare Liberum 
was a reflection of the Netherlands’ vulnerability. As Jan Smits observed, "The 
Dutch had to bargain and beg for the international peace upon which their 
highly advanced trade system, but not that of other nations, depended." (Smits, 
1968:28). Commercially predominant, the Dutch flourished under the freedom 
of the seas, but they were not strong enough to defend it.
Compared to the Netherlands, England was an incipient modern political 
economy geared to dynamic capitalist expansion. By the early 17th century the 
differences between the two economies, and the threat to Britain, was recognized 
by the most modern business factions in England, and seen to be reflected 
principally in the Netherlands’s domination of world shipping. The Grotian 
doctrine of freedom of the seas frustrated the ambitions of many large British 
merchants (Farnell, 1964: 444-445). Even more ominously, the formidable 
Dutch fleet threatened foreign trade and colonial windfalls (Hobsbawm, 1967:53- 




























































































shipping would endanger England’s position in the Americas. In Europe, Dutch 
banking was supreme, and every increase in Dutch shipping and trade, using 
Amsterdam as an entrepot, strengthened Dutch financial and commercial 
interests. English ships were being pushed out of the Baltic while in the Indian 
Ocean Dutch warships were harassing English traders. In 1623 Dutch raiders 
attacked Amboyna, an English settlement, and massacred its inhabitants. Dutch 
shipping was gradually increasing its share of trade with the American colonies. 
Meanwhile, the Dutch fishing fleet was depleting the Scottish and English 
coastal regions. All of these activities were supported by the Dutch Navy. At 
the same time, the technologically superior Dutch shipbuilding industry was 
threatening the further maritime development in England. Given the weakness 
of British shipping, a liberal order posed a direct threat to England’s national 
security and, more generally, to continued economic development (Jones, 
1967:14; Kennedy, 1976: 45-48).
The English Response
Under James I the English government began to chip away at the legal 
foundations of Dutch maritime power. In 1609 it declared that fishing in 
English waters would be reserved for English vessels. Negotiations between the 
Netherlands and England that followed these actions were inconclusive, leading 




























































































advocating the territorial enclosure of the high seas, was the most consistent and 
scholarly defense of mercantilism and rebuttal to Grotian doctrine (Smit, 
1968:28; Gold, 1981:48).
During the first half of the 17th century England gradually introduced new 
protectionist laws and began to enforce existing ones. This trend culminated in 
the Navigation Act of 1651, which expressed England’s most forceful and 
dramatic response to what was now perceived to be a generalized maritime 
crisis. The Act decreed that all imports must be carried on English ships, or in 
the ships of trading partners. It eliminated the Dutch role as cross-trader in 
English and colonial routes, and weakened the position of Dutch ports as 
entrepots. The Act further stipulated that only English ships had the right to 
trade with English colonies. Finally, it decreed that all colonial exports must be 
shipped to England either as final destination or as point of transhipment. This 
act was the most extensive of a long series of measures designed to defend the 
merchant fleet and England’s trade, and it was accompanied by other legislative 
measures, including subsidies to shipbuilding, and the granting of exclusive right 
of carriage to the crown (Harper, 1939; Davis, 1962:304-7;1975:28-36). 
However, given England’s expanding role in world trade and the considerable 
interdependence of the Netherlands and England, the Navigation Act of 1651, 
in Conjunction with related acts, constituted a grave provocation to the Dutch, 





























































































One year after the promulgation of the Act the first Anglo-Dutch war broke 
out. The war was fought entirely on the seas, ending in victory for England. 
Two additional wars (1665-7; 1672-4), both won by England, hastened the 
decline of Dutch power as England then further tightened the restrictions on 
open seas (Gold, 1981:50). As a result of these wars, England was able to 
reorganize its foreign trade on the basis of protectionism. Between 1660 and 
1689 the size of the English fleet increased by a factor of three. As it would do 
so often in the course of history, England replenished its fleet with captured 
enemy prices; as a result, Dutch shipbuilding technology was copied and thus 
another pillar of Dutch power crumbled (Davis, 1962:50-52; 1975:32). Victory 
in war and the successes engineered by the Navigation Acts thus led to 
immediate tangible gains for British commerce. More generally, they facilitated 
a wholesale restructuring of the international political economy. This 
restructuring produced tangible gains for England by paving the way for rapid 
national economic development and foreign trade that could not have taken 
place under a free trading system, including the domination of transatlantic 
shipping with its implications for colonial expansion; a secure basis for 
shipbuilding expansion; access to the Baltic trades and ports; and the 
subordination of Britain’s principal commercial rival. These basic changes 




























































































challenges from France and other powers, and so paved the way for the future 
expansion of British imperialism.
The World System and Domestic Class Formation
England’s decision to challenge the Netherlands clearly can be seen to 
express a broader logic of the world system inasmuch as Dutch capitalism was 
probably not sufficiently modern and progressive to lay the basis for further 
global capitalist expansion yet served to frustrated English economic 
development. The Netherlands was, as Eric Hobsbawm notes, "a feudal business 
economy," geared to a role as commercial and financial intermediary, which 
meant that its ruling class was "sacrificing Dutch manufactures to the huge 
vested interests of trading and finance... (and) encouraging manufactures in 
feudal and semi-colonial areas where they were not strong enough to break out 
of the older social framework." (Hobsbawm, 1967: 45). However, the 
transformation of British policy can hardly be said to derive spontaneously from 
the necessities of capitalist development or an incipient change in the global 
configuration of power. The decision to go to war was predicated on 
revolutionary social and political upheavals in English society that reflected an 
internal dynamic. Prior to the English Revolution, the monopolist trading 
companies dominated commercial policy. Enjoying Royalist patronage, they 




























































































Their limited outlook and parasitic approach to commerce made them less aware 
of the long-range implications of Dutch hegemony for English economic 
development and, consequently, unwilling to devote the resources to maintain 
a strong Navy (Kennedy, 1976: 46-7; Farnell, 1964:446). In addition, these 
companies had forged close links to the Dutch. These factors served to limit the 
willingness of the pre-revolutionary state to issue a frontal challenge to the 
Netherlands.
Under Oliver Cromwell’s leadership, the situation changed dramatically. 
Cromwell helped consolidated the power of the "mercantile interests," a new and 
rising segment of the emerging commercial bourgeoisie which favored a more 
modern approach to state-building and a more progressive and expansive 
definition of the national interest. The new government responded to the needs 
of a broader range of commercial interests, including those less tied to the 
monarchy. The result was "a general alliance between government and business, 
with the former ensuring that the latter could flourish, and gaining in return 
increased customs and excise receipts, and parliamentary votes of supply, to 
finance its policies of trade protection" (Kennedy, 1976: 47). This new alliance, 
strongly anti-Dutch, recognized that the Navigation Acts could simultaneously 
enhance English military power and the needs of English commerce.
Thus the Navigation Acts served not only to serve England’s international 




























































































segment of the bourgeoisie. Cromwell’s regime replaced the policy of granting 
exclusive spheres of interest with one "open to the whole merchant class" 
(Kennedy, 1976: 65), modernized the navy, and vigorously prosecuted the war 
with the Netherlands. Although many exporters and importers initially opposed 
mercantilism, recognizing that the need to rely on higher-priced British vessels 
would raise their costs (Barbour, 1954:233), the modernizing British state was 
responding to broader developmental needs. A liberal maritime policy might 
have been good for business in the short-term because it cheapened the cost of 
ocean transportation, but it was not desirable either from the point of view of 
the long-range development of British capitalism and Empire, or the desire to 
curb Dutch influence.
II. THE RETURN TO FREEDOM OF THE SEAS
The Navigation Acts served as the nucleus of the mercantilist system. Their 
longevity—almost two centuries—can be explained with reference to the general 
requirements of the mercantilist system, the particular needs of British 
imperialism, and Parliamentary politics. The more or less permanent, albeit 
limited, global warfare between France and England that followed the Anglo- 




























































































In contrast to the previous period, conflict did not center around the nature of 
the system itself (mercantilist or liberal) but rather on expansion within the 
given system.
Repeal of the Navigation Acts
In 1849 the British Parliament unilaterally abrogated the Navigation Acts in 
favor of a liberal system of free access to ships and cargoes (Williams, 1972; 
Halevy, 1961; Palmer, 1991). In abandoning the old order, Britain repealed a 
dense thicket of protectionist laws designed to protect its shipowners and 
signalled its intention to trading partners to accept principles of competition. 
The main features of the new order included the abolition of preferential 
treatment for the national-flag fleet, guarantees for shipowners of equal access 
to cargoes, and guarantees for shippers of equal access to vessels of all states.
The abolition of the Navigation Acts symbolized the strategic decision of 
the British state to transform its foreign economic policy from one of 
mercantilism to liberalism. The politics of repeal of the Acts are intricately 
woven into the fabric of general political and economic events of the period: the 
Reform Bill of 1832, which augmented the political power of the industrialists; 
the abolition of the Corn Laws, a further reflection of the decline of the landed 
gentry; dramatic financial reforms initiated by Prime Minister Robert Peel, who 




























































































commercial treaty of 1860 and subsequent trade agreements and unilateral 
actions by which Britain lowered tariff barriers. Although the restoration of the 
freedom of the seas regime received widespread support from Britain’s trading 
partners, it also depended on the consolidation of state power of Britain’s 
industrial bourgeoisie, the ability of the state (at least initially) to act 
independently of shipowners as an interest group, and the acquisition of an 
enormous comparative advantage in steel and steam technology. In the case of 
both the Netherlands and Britain (although not, as we shall see, the United 
States), the liberal system also supported, for a short period of time, the virtual 
monopoly of the one nation’s shipowners. Between 1849 and 1900 British 
shipping was largely unchallenged. After 1900, however, other core states 
including France, Japan, and, especially, Germany began to challenge the 
monopoly of British shipping.
The mid-19th century transition from mercantilism to free trade has received 
a great deal of attention within the context of the "theory of hegemonic 
stability." Proponents of the theory have explained British policy in terms of 
international systemic factors and Britain’s economic and military supremacy, 
while devoting less attention to the domestic politics of liberalization, or the 
specific mechanisms whereby systemic change was linked to domestic policy 
(Kindleberger, 1975; Krasner, 1976; Wallerstein, 1979). Yet, there is a broad 




























































































Kennedy, 1976: 157-163; Webster, 1963), so the correlation between hegemony
and liberalism is highly problematic. The "balance of power" alone does not
explain the transformation of British commercial policy (McKeown, 1986). As
O’Brien and Pigman note (1992: 94),
In terms of military and economic resources Britain emerged as arguably 
the ’greatest power’ to sign the Treaty of Vienna in 1815. But neither 
Castlereigh nor other members of Liverpool’s administration showed any 
disposition to use the occasion of a European settlement following the 
defeat of Napoleonic France to foster or pressure for a more liberal 
trading regime-tangible manifestations of a potential for the exercise of 
British hegemony (including the relative strength of its economy and 
fiscal system, supremacy at sea and a position of primacy in the 
Congresses and Councils of European powers) produced very little change 
in the practice, form or results achieved by British economic diplomacy 
for more than three decades after Wellington’s victory at Waterloo.
One solution to this problem is to analyze British policy by treating domestic
and international variables in isolation from each other. In the case of British
policy, there is ample evidence that internal developments including the
problems of industrialization, constitutional issues, and the changing center of
gravity within the bourgeoisie itself provided strong impulses towards
liberalization. Following this approach, O’Brien and Pigman conclude that the
politics of free trade in England "represented a major political and constitutional
episode in domestic politics only tangentially related to broader (and less
controversial) debates over free trade and tariff reform." (1992: 96). The
political elite and ruling class "were blissfully ignorant" of the global




























































































The specific analysis of shipping, however, suggests the need to adopt a 
more nuanced view of the relationship between domestic change in Britain and 
global development of free trade. To be sure, maritime liberalization cannot 
be derived straightforwardly from the "global power shift," which had occurred 
decades before its realization. Moreover, there is little evidence to suggest that 
the political elite were as aware of their "hegemonic responsibilities," as their 
20th century American counterparts. At the same time, however, it is clear that 
these elites were well aware that liberalization would simultaneously enhance 
Britain’s maritime power and appeal to the interests of trading partners.
Robert Peel himself cited four specific reasons for abandoning mercantilism, 
all of which dealt with the international situation. First, the colonies were 
growing increasingly dissatisfied with privileges granted to British shipowners. 
Both the colonies and the newly independent countries of South America were 
diversifying their trade, and rules mandating the use of British vessels were 
increasingly viewed as inefficient and expensive. Second, the other core powers 
also had many grievances against the mercantilist system, and many had favored 
a more open system since the beginning of the 19th century. Third, Peel 
mentioned the "mutilated and shattered state"(Halevy, 1961:275) of the laws, 
which had been amended piecemeal over the years, and particularly during the 
1820s under Huskisson. Finally, the great complexity of the reciprocity treaties 





























































































The great clamor from England’s trading partners for abolition of the 
Navigation Acts attests to the support which Britain enjoyed from a broad 
coalition of core states in favor of liberal policies. Clearly, the re-establishment 
of freedom of the seas could facilitate the consolidation of British leadership, 
even if all of the implications of this leadership were not perceived by British 
elites. The system greatly favored British trading and shipping interests, but it 
also responded to the desires of major trading partners.
Protectionism had limited British access to foreign ports and trade; it 
proscribed cross-trading which, as the British state but not the timid and 
recalcitrant shipowners recognized, Britain was poised to dominate. 
Mercantilism’s chief antagonists were the Manchester industrialists and 
messianic free traders. Britain’s economic and commercial predominance 
created strong incentives to build a liberal trading order in which it was poised 
to reap the largest gains. As a British governmental report (Booth Committee 
Report, 1918:71) later observed:
In view of its great size, the British merchant marine stood to gain 
more from free access to foreign countries than foreign flags stood 
to gain from free access to British ports; and conversely a policy 
of mutual restriction would for the same reason have caused more 
harm to British than to foreign shipping.
Britain’s industrial leadership was so overwhelming that most trading partners,




























































































expansion, had no desire to compete with Britain’s merchant fleet. Throughout 
the 19th century they preferred the benefits of free competition for cargoes and 
vessels to the costs of establishing their own national merchant fleets. In the 
case of both the Netherlands and Britain (although not, as we shall see, the 
United States), the liberal system also supported the virtual monopoly of one 
nation’s shipowners. Between 1849 and 1900 British shipping was largely 
unchallenged.
The World System and Domestic Class Formation
In abolishing the Navigation Acts, the British state thus responded favorably 
to a changing set of external demands while simultaneously establishing a 
system that was highly beneficial for the expansion of British commerce. Its 
actions were, however, greatly dependent on the domestic transformation of 
class forces. In particular, state policy was directly responsible for the defeat of 
backward sections of the English bourgeoisie, including the large and powerful 
shipping lobby. These forces were united around preservation of the old order, 
and demanded continuing protection for agriculture as well as shipping. On the 
one hand, most shipowners were ardent protectionists. On the other hand, 
British capital as a whole was reluctant to invest in new shipbuilding 
technology, and this gave further impetus to the forces of the old order arrayed 




























































































steamship—primarily by granting mail subsidies to steamship owners, a common 
pre-World War I subsidy. According to one observer, the British Admiralty was 
the "premier founder of the steamship lines..." (Otterson, 1945: 19-20).
Just as Cromwell’s revolution had set the stage for the Navigation Acts by 
curbing the power of Royalist merchants, so the social and political upheavals 
associated with the rise of the industrial bourgeoisie was a condition of their 
repeal. Indeed, the substantial period of time between the emergence of 
international demands and the Parliament’s repeal shows that England’s social 
and political transformation was a decisive factor in moving to a free trade 
system and that "major revisions to the kingdom’s tariff and navigation policies 
that occurred from 1842-9 were prompted by an promoted for almost purely 
domestic political reasons." (O’Brien and Pigman, 1992: 111).
Ironically, most British shipowners lobbied aggressively in support of the 
Navigation Acts (Palmer, 1991). They lamented the lower cost of labor aboard 
foreign (eg. Scandinavian, American) vessels, and warned that free trade in 
shipping would pose a grave danger to national security (Clapham, 1962:175- 
176). The question of repeal was closely linked to a larger set of social 
problems attendant with the rise of industrial capitalism. Free traders proposed 
the abolition of the Acts as the solution to labor and manning problems; 
defenders of the old order claimed the opposite. In any case, the shipowners 




























































































from free trade. By 1849, the center of gravity in Parliament had decisively 
shifted in favor of industrial interests and the shipowner’s lobby was 
overwhelmed. Thus, in the 17th century the state intervened on behalf of 
shipowners; in the 19th century, acting within a very different international and 
domestic context, it ignored their demands for protection, rejecting their narrow 
interests in favor of a broader view of the interests of industrial capital as a 
whole.
The restoration of liberalism helped to consolidate the position of British 
imperialism and also reinforced the position of London as the premier financial, 
commercial, and insurance center. Despite the alarmist views of the shipowners, 
"the monopoly of British carriers more and more nearly approached being one 
of the carrying trade of the world." (Otterson, 1945: 49) Shipping strengthened 
banking by establishing London as the major entrepot, conferring many 
attendant sources of profit on the City. The abandonment of the Navigation 
Acts made it possible for the state eventually to retreat from the affairs of the 
shipowners. By 1880 British steam tonnage exceeded that of the rest of the 




























































































III. U.S. MARITIME POLICY: FROM NATIONALISM TO HEGEMONY
The steamship fostered a dramatic expansion of world trade and opened 
opportunities to trade in a range of new agricultural commodities. However, 
political and economic forces that were called into play by the dynamism of the 
liberal system developed in the last two decades of the nineteenth century, 
ultimately destroyed free trade and inaugurated a new phase of international 
political economy. This phase may be described in terms of related political and 
economic trends: first, the intensification of international rivalry, marked by 
expansionist colonial policies and the struggle against British dominance; and 
second, the increasing concentration and centralization of capital, both nationally 
and transnational^, in conjunction with a greatly enlarged role of the state in 
economic affairs.
World Shipping in the Age of Imperialism
These two trends were reflected with great clarity in shipping. Between 
1880 and 1900 the liberal system was transformed into one dominated by cartels 
and guided, directly or indirectly, by state intervention. The trends towards 
concentration of ownership and international rivalry were mutually reinforcing, 
and had immediate repercussions on shipping. Politically, growing Anglo- 




























































































economies of scale, especially in Germany, and the development of closer 
relations between exporters and shipowners. The German government 
encouraged these trends by facilitating mergers to strengthen national shipping 
and directly or indirectly implementing cargo reservation schemes, including the 
reservation of human cargo (Booth Committee Report, 1918: 230-232).
The prime expression of the new economic and political trends was the 
international liner conference or cartel. The liner conference represents, in part, 
an idiosyncratic institution specific to international shipping (Marx, 1953; 
Deakin, 1973; Cafruny, 1985,1987). However, the development of conferences 
depended on political as well as economic forces. Conferences made it possible 
to rationalize freight markets and provided the means by which the leading 
shipowners, still predominantly British, could protect their markets from the 
predations of new competitors. Prior to the development of the steamship, 
regular services were not generally possible due to the vagaries of wind 
propulsion. Once the steamship provided the technical means whereby regular 
services could be provided, liner firms sought to protect their market shares 
from the incursions of "outsiders" who might destabilize freight markets by 
"creaming off" lucrative cargoes without providing regular services. By the turn 
of the century most of the world’s trading routes were organized by conferences, 
with English shipowners assuming organizational leadership. Conferences thus 




























































































the general tendency towards concentration of capital, and their significance was 
recognized by Lenin (1939: 19,73) as well as Hobson. (1916: 175-6).
Although they did not formally abrogate the principle of free trade, liner 
conferences were the most obvious form of restraint on competition. Their 
monopolistic and anti-competitive nature was masked not only by the lack of 
overt state involvement in the affairs of conferences, but also because cartels 
could be defended, not implausibly, as being necessary to the functioning of a 
stable market. However, many other anti-competitive practices began to flourish 
by the turn of the century. These included shipper-shipowner collusion, flag 
discrimination as state policy, and various forms of subsidies and promotional 
measures designed to assist national-flag shipping.
During the interwar period shipping nationalism intensified as all 
governments intervened on behalf of their maritime industries. Attempts to 
reduce the level of intervention by international agreement failed. After World 
War II, however, the United States exerted strong leadership in order to restore 
a modified form of a shipping liberalism. The comparison of U.S. policy during 
and immediately after each world war illustrates a shows how interrelated 





























































































World War I and the D evelopm ent o f  U.S. Protectionism
America’s participation in World War I led to a great expansion of its 
maritime sector with the aid of massive subsidies. At the same time, a 
legislative phase was inaugurated that had great international repercussions. 
Under the pressure of freight rate increases, two protectionist laws, the U.S. 
Shipping Act of 1916 and the Jones Act of 1920 were passed. The U.S 
Shipping Act outlawed the use of the deferred rebate, the means by which 
shipping cartels enforced the loyalty of shippers, blunting the power of liner 
conferences and antagonizing European shipping firms. The Jones Act reserved 
a substantial amount of cargo to U.S.-flag vessels.
American maritime policy in the inter-war period thus greatly encouraged 
the development of mercantilism. The growth of U.S.-flag merchant shipping 
constituted a grave threat to Britain, and was perceived as such on both sides of 
the Atlantic. It made wartime collaboration difficult, and contributed to serious 
Anglo-American tensions during the 1920s. The expansion of tonnage 
represented more than simply a contribution to the Allied war effort. During the 
period of American neutrality, shipping was a means by which the United States 
attempted to penetrate foreign markets vacated by the combatants. The question 
of how this tonnage would be employed after the war preoccupied shipowners 
and governments of all the major powers. Edward Hurley, Chairman of the U.S. 




























































































My whole thought is to get a fleet of large-sized ships ... so that we 
may be able to compete with Germany and England after the war 
... Instead of being associated with England in the fight against 
Germany [the United States should] watch England to prevent her 
from gaining commercial advantage at the present time, and 
particularly after the war.
Hurley’s successors, John Barton Payne and Admiral Benson, were even more 
rabidly nationalistic and Anglophobic. In 1919 they were "bent on eliminating 
[Britain] from competition by driving it into bankruptcy." (Safford, 1981: 268). 
Benson, according to the Secretary of War, dreamed of a "fierce and final 
competition" between British and American shipping (Safford, 1981: 268). 
Anglo-American confrontation reflected the larger inability of the core states, 
lacking central leadership, to resolve fundamental problems of shipping shares.
After World War I the range of interventionist practices increased 
substantially as most governments were drawn more closely into the affairs of 
the maritime industries. In the United States, a massive shipping and 
shipbuilding sector had been created largely through government aid. However, 
as a result of international competition and gross inefficiency, it declined 
rapidly, and in 1935 it narrowly escaped nationalization. The Axis powers 
sought to organize shipping as a central element of national military and 
economic policy. Even in most of the traditionally liberal shipping nations, the 




























































































World War II and the Restoration o f  Liberalism
The sharp antagonism that prevailed among shipowners on each side of the 
Atlantic did not entirely abate either during World War II or immediately 
afterward, despite the experience of wartime collaboration. Shipowners on both 
sides of the Atlantic remained acutely aware of their economic rivalry and the 
implications of wartime developments for postwar commercial plans; the 
frictions of World War I and the interwar years were not completely forgotten. 
In 1943 Lord Rotherwick, Chairman of Clan Line, expressed the typical British 
view in urging that the British merchant fleet should rapidly be increased after 
the war to prewar tonnage levels through the transfer of enemy shipping and the 
construction of vessels for British owners in enemy shipyards. American 
owners countered by reiterating their historical grievances against European 
owners and advocating wholesale protectionism.
World War II thus interrupted but did not completely eradicate traditional 
maritime rivalries. However, the comparison of Allied shipping collaboration 
during both wars vividly illustrates the development of a new, more conciliatory 
approach to shipping questions on the part of the United States. As Safford 
(1981: 269) has observed,
In the great conflict of 1914-18, and directly beyond, Anglo- 
American maritime tensions were fraught with extraordinary 
rivalries, suspicions, and enmity. While corresponding patterns 
seemed possible for the Second World War, a similar tack was 




























































































men determined to mend the ways of the past.
Hostility between shipowners on each side of the Atlantic thus remained but, in 
contrast to World War I, did not resonate in governmental or leading corporate 
circles. The government actively intervened to establish a more open, 
cooperative system, largely resisting the desire of its shipowners to return to 
maritime nationalism.
In contrast to their World War I predecessors, the leading War Shipping 
Administrators were committed to "shipping liberalism" which meant, in 
practical terms, a pro- European stance. Lewis Douglas, Chairman of the War 
Shipping Administration and protege of Cordell Hull, headed "the most potent 
pro-British team in the United States War Administration" (Safford, 1981: 269). 
In contrast to the narrow nationalism displayed during World War I, the United 
States actually agreed to provide ships for British owners to maintain their 
services in southern Pacific markets on a caretaker basis(Safford, 1981: 275). 
During and after World War I, Britain was unable to deliver coal to Italy, a 
traditional market for British exports, because of industrial militancy. The 
United States eagerly stepped into the breach, despite British protest, with 
Colonel House observing that the United States was "hitting at two [of 
England’s] most lucrative industries." During World War II a similar situation 
arose due to shortages of coal in Britain. This time, however, Lewis Douglas 




























































































by committing American vessels to carry British coal to Italy(Safford, 1981: 
275).
The nature of allied shipping collaboration after World War II foreshadowed 
the shape of the postwar maritime order, just as it had during World War I. 
Despite its mercantilist tradition and the still-virulent protectionist outlook of 
shipowners, Washington adopted a liberal postwar attitude that was consistent 
with its general economic philosophy as well as the maritime strategies of other 
core powers. Policymakers sought to organize a regime based on free trade 
principles. In their view, an open world freight market would further the 
expansion of world trade by establishing a rational division of labor. The law 
of comparative advantage would enable the most efficient shipowners to expand 
their operations, causing a secular decline in ocean freight rates. Specialization 
of countries and regions with a comparative advantage—notably Britain, 
Scandinavia, and Greece—would be an integrative force discouraging the use of 
subsidies which promoted conflict during the interwar years.
This approach, which reflected the desire to accommodate Western Europe, 
thus represented an unprecedented and dramatic change in American policy. 
Now the United States recognized the economic importance of shipping to 
Western and Northern Europe, for whom shipping was "the nerve center of their 
national life,"(Safford, 1981: 276). and worked to restore these nations to then- 




























































































in the form of limited subsidies and cargo-protection. Although these 
concessions elicited deep hostility from Europe, they were in fact very limited, 
and helped to guarantee the essential liberality of the new liberal order.
The post-war organization of shipping entailed a general opening or 
unification of the market. It did not, however, result in a purely laissez-faire 
system in the classical sense because shipping cartels, largely dominated by the 
Europeans, remained central to the new order. Conferences were allowed to 
operate largely beyond the practical sway of the U.S. government, despite its 
considerable body of regulatory legislation. The cartels were granted basic 
decisionmaking functions, including the determination of freight rates and the 
distribution of shipping shares among firms. Of course, the system was not 
without contradictions, and would eventually set in motion conflict and 
instability. In bulk shipping, an area which was strategically important to 
multinational oil and other extractive firms, the United States was unwilling to 
make concessions and established its domination through the use of flags of 
convenience. As its industrial competitiveness diminished and the size of its 
liner fleet shrank during the 1960s and 1970s, the United States grew less 
tolerant of the concessions it had made and sought to limit the power of 
shipping cartels (Cafruny, 1985, 1987).
The governments and shipowners of the other core powers readily supported 




























































































industries meant that the United States had the power unilaterally to write the 
rules. Had the United States chosen to exercise all of its power, and had the 
shipowners been permitted to preserved their influence over maritime policy, 
then the ensuing regime would undoubtedly been cast in a highly protectionist 
or "national capitalist" mold, resulting in an accentuation of the trend of the 
interwar period. Developing in a climate of Anglo-American hostility, American 
shipowners, unlike their banker and manufacturer compatriots, had not had their 
protectionist sentiments softened by the successful but limited pre-World War 
I expansion into world trade. On the contrary, the drive for foreign markets had 
actually confirmed and enhanced their nationalist instincts as the inefficient 
shipowners had entered an environment already carved up and monopolized by 
the Europeans. In contrast to most other sectors of the international economy, 
the most ardent nationalists were American, while the liberals were European.
The World System and Domestic Class Formation
Overcoming the legacy of maritime nationalism represented a serious 
challenge to the architects of the post-war order. The importance of shipping 
to the Europeans meant that generalized protection would conflict with the needs 
of European reconstruction. Moreover, as during the 1840s, a nationalistic 
regime was incompatible with a generally liberal order, not only because it 




























































































principle of free trade. Internationally, American planners needed to reconcile 
the interests of two antagonistic shipping blocs. Domestically, they had to 
contend with the nationalism of shipowners and maritime unions, groups which 
had gained prestige in the course of the war, and had powerful backers in 
Congress. Finally, American planners had to balance the interests of Europe 
with the strategic requirement of the United States to maintain a substantial 
merchant marine.
Given these obstacles, the establishment of a relatively open, stable system 
was a major diplomatic and political accomplishment. The concept of 
hegemony is useful in characterizing the nature of power relations in the new 
order (Gramsci, 1971; Cox, 1981; Cafruny, 1990; Gill, 1993), and particularly 
the interrelationship between changes in the American political economy and the 
international system in the aftermath of the war. As Antonio Gramsci writes 
(Gramsci, 1971:161),
The fact of hegemony presupposes that account be taken of the 
interests and tendencies of the groups over which hegemony is to 
be exercised, and that a certain compromise equilibrium should be 
formed—in other words, that the leading group should make 
sacrifices of an economic-corporate kind. But there is no doubt 
that such sacrifices and such compromises cannot touch the 
essential; for though hegemony is ethical-political, it must also be 
based on the decisive function exercised by the leading group in 
the decisive nucleus of economic activity.
Although Gramsci applied the concept of hegemony to national society, he




























































































changes in international society, thus emphasizing the continuities between 
societies, states, and international systems (Cox, 1981).
America’s changing attitude towards international shipping questions, as 
evidenced in the contrast between pre- and post-war policy, provides a vivid 
example of the social transformation that occurred during the 1930s and 1940s. 
The Great Depression propelled a bloc of "multinational liberals" into power 
(Ferguson, 1984; van der Pijl, 1984; Frieden, 1988). This coalition represented 
a new center of gravity in American capitalism, based on export-oriented, high 
technology industries, international banks, and multinational oil. The influence 
of internationalists derived from their political ascendancy over protectionist 
forces which either lacked a sophisticated understanding of hegemonic duties 
and possibilities, or represented particular interests that were destined to lose out 
in the post-war order. Their power was cemented as America emerged to a 
position of clear preponderance.
The political clout of American shipowners as an interest group, so 
noticeable American policy during World War I and the inter-war period, 
reflected these structural changes in American society. American shipowners 
were strongly dependent on cheap and relatively unskilled labor to compete 
favorably in international markets (Cafruny, 1987), and were closely aligned 
with isolationists and other business protectionists with whom they shared an 




























































































labor relations on the basis of a "politics of productivity" (Maier, 1978; 
Ferguson, 1984; Frieden, 1988), they strongly opposed free trade. Yet, the most 
important architects of American shipping policy in the post-war period— 
William Clayton, Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs, Edward 
Stettinius, former Secretary of State and founder of the Liberian -flag registry, 
and Lewis Douglas—decisively rejected a return to pre-war nationalism, and 
recognized that this would inevitably circumscribe America’s post-war role in 
shipping. Their commitment to an "Atlantic Liberal" conception of the world 
economy, which was reflected in the Executive Branch as well as in Congress, 
led them to make significant concessions to trading partners, and to resist the 
nationalist demands of American shipowners and their congressional backers. 
Perhaps the most tangible results of this commitment were the decision to sell 
American vessels en masse to European owners through the Ship Sales Act of 
1946 (Sturmey, 1962: 155-6), and the limitation of the powers of the Federal 
Maritime Board, the shipowners main base of support within the government.
The reconstruction of liberalism after the intense nationalism of the interwar 
period thus indicates the interplay between domestic and international structures. 
America’s conversion to maritime liberalism reflected not only its rise to global 
power, which in purely relational terms had existed since 1917 (Kennedy, 1976; 




























































































America’s post-World War II policy bears comparison with Britain’s abolition 
of the Navigation Acts. In both cases, state intervention was necessary to 
overcome the resistance of domestic class fractions to a new policy of free trade. 
Whereas British policy reflected little more than calculations of narrow self- 
interest, American policy was more self-consciously hegemonic in the sense that 
it partially sacrificed the interests of its own shipowners to ensure a stable 
international division of labor.
IV. CONCLUSION
This account of international maritime development has assumed the existence 
of identifiable continuities in social structure, the state, and the international 
system. While recognizing that the international environment establishes 
specific constraints and opportunities for states, it rejects a rigid distinction 
between "levels of analysis" in favor an approach which situates domestic class 
formation and resulting state interest within a specific global context, thereby 
emphasizing the mutual determination of domestic and international forces.
As realists have shown, the international power configuration greatly 
influences the behavior of states in predictable ways. At a broad level of 




























































































policy that guarantees security. Yet, the imperatives of global structures 
considered in isolation from domestic social and political forces do not 
adequately explain for state behavior. The passage of the Navigation Acts in the 
17th century, their abolition in the 19th, and the restoration of liberalism in the 
20th centuries each coincided with basic transformations in the politics of the 
dominant power. In each case, "archaic" class fractions were tied to the old 
international order, while more modern fractions actively sought to establish a 
new order that conformed to a their own broader national and international 
interest. The English trading companies pursued narrow and exclusionary aims 
and neglected the navy, thereby permitting Dutch power to limit England’s 
economic development. By contrast, the more modern commercial interests 
represented in Cromwell’s revolution favored mercantilism, leading them to 
declare war on the Netherlands. The abolition of the Navigation Acts was a 
function not only of Britain’s rise to global hegemony, but also of the decisive 
political conquest of Manchester over the landed gentry. In the 20th century, 
the inability of internationalists to break the strategic hold of isolationists over 
American foreign policy underlay the strident shipping nationalism of World 
War I and the interwar period. The establishment of a liberal system after 
World War II directly reflected the ascendance of a "multinational liberal" 
coalition in the United States.




























































































these conjunctures, this does not mean that the state served as a passive 
instrument of interest groups. Indeed, in no case did the shipowners themselves 
prevail in the making of maritime policy. Rather, the state formulated and 
carried out a general maritime strategy that conformed to a broader conception 
of "national interest." This interest was defined by an internally dominant or 
hegemonic class fraction whose power base was strengthened by new 
international rules and practices.
The implications of this analysis for International Relations theory might be 
summed up in a plea for greater modesty coupled with an emphasis on concrete 
historical research. While recognizing the importance of cyclical tendencies, this 
study does not claim to uncover abstract laws and rhythms of the international 
political economy that operate across historical periods and independently of 
domestic social, economic, and political forces. International systemic 
interpretations of cycles of free trade and protectionism have had only limited 
success; both authors and their critics have often concluded with a 
recommendation to integrate domestic factors into the analysis (eg. McKeown, 
1986; O’Brien and Pigman, 1992; Krasner, 1976; Keohane, 1984). Moreover, 
systemic approaches lack depth because they provide no statements about the 
specific practices and dynamics within a given historical period that have been 
or are likely to produce instability, conflict, and change. Although the focus on 




























































































more limited generalizations about the historically contingent strategies of 
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